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GridReliability remains a fundamental principle of grid
modernization efforts, but in today’s world, reliability
requires cybersecurity. This article discusses energy sector
partnerships that are designing cybersecurity into the
smart grid with the vision of surviving a cyber-incident
while sustaining critical energy delivery functions.Carol Hawk and Akhlesh KaushivaI. The Power Grid:
Beyond SmartThe power grid is already
smart, if ‘‘smart’’ can describe an
engineering masterpiece that is
the largest machine ever created
by humankind and that has
delivered reliable power for over
100 years. Today, reliability
remains a fundamental principle
of grid modernization efforts.
As the power grid increasingly
uses modern computational
platforms, field devices, and
communication networks, it gains
access to new and higher-
resolution data. New ways ofan open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2014.08.008measuring, analyzing, and
communicating data support new
capabilities for enhanced grid
reliability, resiliency, and
efficiency.
In today’s world, reliability
requires cybersecurity. A cyber-
attack on devices that protect and
control the power grid could
result in power disruption or
damaged equipment. It must also
be kept in mind that installation of
inappropriate cybersecurity
controls could interfere with
critical energy delivery functions.
This article discusses energy
sector partnerships that are
designing cybersecurity into thelicense (http:// The Electricity Journal
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Figure 1: Power Grid Communications and Control Architecture
Osmart grid with the vision of
surviving a cyber-incident while
sustaining critical energy delivery
functions.II. Cybersecurity for the
Power Grid – First, Do
No HarmCybersecurity solutions for
critical energy infrastructure are
imperative for reliable energy
delivery. In today’s highly
connected world, with an
increasingly sophisticated cyber-
threat, it is unrealistic to assume
energy delivery systems are
isolated or immune from
compromise.
C ybersecurity for the powergrid must be carefully
engineered to not interfere with
energy delivery functions. For
instance, the power grid has some
legacy devices that are decades
old, with limited computational
resources and communications
bandwidth to support
cybersecurity protections. Controlctober 2014, Vol. 27, Issue 8 1040-6190/Publand protection devices are widely
distributed; some in unmanned,
remote substations or on top of
poles in publicly accessible areas.
Access controls are important and
must not jeopardize normal
operations or emergency
responses. Effective cybersecurity
protections are necessary, and
must work well within the
operational environment of
energy delivery systems.
T he power grid transmits anddistributes electrical power
generated from primary fossil or
renewable energy resources, such
as coal or wind. Computers and
networks manage, monitor,
protect, and control the
continuous, real-time delivery of
electrical power (Figure 1).A. Computers and networks
manage, monitor, protect and
control the power gridOperation technology (OT)
computers and networks for
energy delivery systems allow
operators to maintain situationalished by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).,awareness, perform economic
dispatch of energy resources, plan
for contingencies, and balance
generation with load in real time.
These capabilities are often
provided by an energy
management system (EMS) that
resides in a utility control center
and performs state estimation,
contingency analysis and
automatic generation control
(AGC). The EMS receives data
from a supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) system
that acquires power system
operating measurements every
two to five seconds from
specialized devices in substations.
The EMS state estimator uses
SCADA data, data conveyed
through the Inter-Control Center
Communication Protocol (ICCP)
from other utility’s control
centers, and the laws of physics to
estimate the operational state of
the power grid every few
minutes. This information
provides operators with the
situational awareness to make
informed decisions, such asunder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2014.08.008
85
From a cybersecurity
perspective, physical
consequences of malicious
commands can be
modeled as contingencies
to assess risk and develop
mitigations well in
advance.
86optimized power flow for
economic and efficient generation
dispatch. State estimators also
detect and reject corrupted data
from malfunctioning sensors.
New methods, such as Security-
Oriented Cyber-Physical State
Estimation (SCPSE), are being
developed to detect data that have
been maliciously compromised
with the intent to misrepresent
grid operations (Zonouz et al.,
2012).
T he EMS performs real-timecontingency analysis to
anticipate grid instabilities that
might result from a major grid
component failure, such as the
loss of a generator or transmission
line. This analysis shows how
power grid operating conditions
could evolve in response to the
loss of particular components at
that moment and supports
planning to ensure that grid
operating limits would not be
violated if such a contingency
were to occur. Automated
remedial action schemes (RASs)
or special protection systems
(SPS) ensure the grid remains
stable even if a major component
is unexpectedly lost. From a
cybersecurity perspective,
physical consequences of
malicious commands can be
modeled as contingencies to
assess risk and develop
mitigations well in advance.
The AGC allows a balancing
authority to adjust generation to
meet power demand in real time
as load connects to and
disconnects from the grid.
Protection and control devices,1040-6190/Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).such as intelligent electronic
devices (IEDs) with embedded
operating systems, are used at
the generation, transmission,
and increasingly the
distribution levels. These
devices measure and
automatically react to grid
operating conditions within
milliseconds, a few cycles at
60 Hz, to prevent equipment
from exceeding safe operating
limits and keep the grid stable.T here are nearly 100 ANSIstandard device numbers
describing features of different
protective devices (IEEE Std
C37.2-2008). Examples include
devices that monitor phase
differences and protect generators
from loss of synchronization with
the grid; protect transmission
lines from exceeding rated
current carrying capacity;
monitor over or under frequency
conditions, over or under voltage
conditions, implement
compensating voltage control
when needed or, in an emergency,
prioritized load shedding to
protect grid stability. Capabilitiesopen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND licen
, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2014.08.008are in place today, and continue to
improve, that secure these devices
from cyber-exploitation by
adversaries seeking to misuse
them, causing them to disrupt,
instead of protect, power flow.B. Cybersecurity protections
are imperative, and must not
interfere with energy delivery
functionsCybersecurity for the smart
grid is bringing together two
communities that until recently
have spoken different languages.
Information technology (IT)
speaks the language of computers
and networks that support utility
business administrative
processes. OT speaks the
language of electronic devices
with embedded operating
systems streamlined to support
energy delivery functions, and
operational networks. Utility IT
and OT differ in important ways,
making cybersecurity protections
that are appropriate for one often
inappropriate, and even
potentially damaging, for the
other. However, each has benefits
that can be gained from the other.
IT is increasingly being adapted
to support OT in utilities so that
operating systems, computer
platforms, and networks
commonly used in IT are now
found in some OT architectures.
Segmented communication paths
are architected to provide
business IT systems with secure
access to selected OT data, only
when needed. The increasing use
of IT computers and networks inse (http:// The Electricity Journal
ABB’s Collaborative Defense Project
ABB is collaborating with the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) on R&D
for protection and control devices to recognize and prevent cyber-activity that could
jeopardize grid operations. The team is developing IEC 61850 distributed security
extensions so substation devices can collaboratively validate that inputs, configuration
changes, or power system data make sense within the current operational state of the
power grid (Nuqui and Tang, 2009).
OOT architectures brings the need
to protect these systems against
malware developed to attack IT
systems.III. DOE and the Energy
Sector Are Partnering to
Keep the Smart Grid
Reliable and SecureIndustry and government
partnered to develop the Roadmap
to Achieve Energy Delivery Systems
Cybersecurity, updated in 2011
(Controlsystemsroadmap.net,
2011). The Roadmap presents the
energy sector’s strategy and set of
short-, mid-, and long-term
milestones supporting the vision
of resilient energy delivery
systems that can survive a cyber-
incident while sustaining critical
functions.
The DOE Office of Electricity
Delivery and Energy Reliability
(OE) Cybersecurity for Energy
Delivery Systems (CEDS)
program partners with the energy
sector to research and develop
cybersecurity protections tailored
to the needs of energy delivery
systems, aligned with the
Roadmap. The goal of CEDS is to
enhance the reliability and
resiliency of the nation’s energy
infrastructure by reducing thectober 2014, Vol. 27, Issue 8 1040-6190/Publrisk that energy delivery could be
disrupted by cyber-attacks.A. Designing cybersecurity
into the smart grid at its
foundationCybersecurity is a cornerstone
of the Smart Grid Investment
Grants (SGIG) and Smart Grid
Demonstration Projects (SGDP)
funded by the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) of 2009. Specifically, $3.4
billion of federal funding was
allocated to 99 SGIG projects and
$600 million allocated to SGDP,
with at least 50 percent cost share
contributed by recipients. The
projects have deployed advanced
power system technologies
nationwide, including more than
1,000 phasor measurement units
(PMUs) and 15 million smart
meters in an advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI) (Https,
2014b; SmartGrid.gov, 2014).
Other outcomes include
integrating the advanced
technologies of distribution
automation (DA) and distributed
energy resources (DER).
Recipients developed and
implemented cybersecurity plans
to prevent broad-based systemic
failures in the event of a
cybersecurity breach.ished by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).,T he cybersecurity plans wereinformed by the Roadmap,
the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC)
Cybersecurity Infrastructure
Protection (CIP) standards, and
the NISTIR-7628 among others.
DOE worked in partnership with
recipients, provided subject
matter expertise, and performed
site visits to assess cybersecurity
plan implementation. DOE
hosted two workshops between
2011 and 2013 to review the
cybersecurity status of the
projects and share lessons
learned, such as good industry
practices and areas for
improvement. For more
information, visit
www.smartgrid.gov.B. Phasor measurement units
bring unprecedented wide-
area visibility of grid
operationsPMUs measure synchrophasors
of current, frequency, and voltage
30 times each second, or more
frequently, revealing dynamic
and transient behavior, such as
electromechanical grid
oscillations with characteristic
frequencies of tenths of Hz. PMU
measurements are time-
synchronized, often through the
global positioning system (GPS),
and can be time-aligned with
microsecond precision across
extensive geographic territories.
This provides unprecedented
visibility into the wide area grid
operations, power system state,
voltage stability and islandingunder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2014.08.008
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Figure 2: Lack of Wide-Area Visibility Contributed to 2003 Blackout (Cummings, 2005)
88conditions, giving real-time
indications of grid instabilities
that may originate in distant
regions. Figure 2 shows a
simulated angular separation
during the Aug. 14, 2003,
Northeast Blackout where real-
time wide-area visibility could
have helped prevent a power
outage. PMU measurements, and
other energy sector data, are being
exchanged between utilities with
enhanced security using theBonneville Power Administration’s (BPA’s)
Synchrophasor Network
The BPA synchrophasor network received a Global Energy Award from Platts for grid
optimization in 2013. BPA is part of the ARRA-funded Western Interconnection
Synchrophasor Program, a partnership of 19 utilities to provide real-time visibility of
the western power system covering 14 states, two Canadian provinces, and a portion of
the Baja Peninsula in Mexico. BPA uses a dedicated secure network to share
synchrophasor data with 10 other utilities, gaining visibility of the interconnection
operating conditions well beyond the agency’s borders. BPA collects 137,000 measure-
ments from across the grid every second and analyzes these data in real time to alert
dispatchers when the power system is at risk (Energy.gov, 2014a).Secure Information Exchange
Gateway (SIEGate), developed in
a partnership led by the Grid
Protection Alliance (GPA) (Grid
Protection Alliance, 2011).
T he GPS signals often used totime-synchronize PMU
measurements across wide1040-6190/Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).regions have low signal strength
and can be jammed or spoofed
(Jiang et al., 2013; NERC.com,
2014). Jamming results in a loss of
signal that can be mitigated for
short intervals by the receiver’s
internal clock, while spoofing is
the intentional adjustment of the
time reference provided by GPS.
Multiple receivers that cross-
check with each other is one of
several methods (Liang et al.,
2014) available to protect theintegrity of precise time
synchronization for the power
grid. The Trustworthy Cyber
Infrastructure for the Power Grid
(TCIPG) (Tcipg.org, 2014a), an
academic collaboration that
performs research to reduce the
risk of a cyber-incident disruptingopen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND licen
, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2014.08.008energy delivery, is developing
further mitigations. Also, other
time synchronization methods are
being explored, such as network-
based methods, including
standards-based approaches to
provide interoperability across
vendor solutions.C. Advanced metering
infrastructure enables faster
outage restorationAdvanced metering
infrastructure (AMI) opens two-
way communications between the
energy user and the utility. This
enables informed, economic
energy-usage decisions and
hastens the location and recovery
of distribution-level outages,
further enabled by DA.
Prearranged demand response
(DR) agreements with energy
consumers allow for reduced
consumption on distribution
feeders through dynamic load
control during periods of system
peak energy usage to avoid
emergency voltage reduction.
Cost-effective advanced meter
reading (AMR) decreases the
need for ‘‘truck rolls’’ and saves
operational costs. Cybersecurity
protections are in place, and being
further developed, to protect the
security and privacy of these data.
S mart meters connect a homearea network (HAN) with
Zigbee (and Smart Energy Profile
(SEP) 1.x) enabled home devices,
to a neighborhood area network
(NAN). The National Electric
Sector Cybersecurity
Organization Resourcese (http:// The Electricity Journal
O(NESCOR) (Smartgrid.epri.com,
2014) has developed a ‘‘SEP 1.x
Summary and Analysis
(Smartgrid.epri.com, 2003a)’’ that
provides guidance to further
strengthen AMI and HAN
cybersecurity protections.D. Distribution automation
enables grid self-healingIn addition to easing outage
restoration, DA can avoid
additional disruptions by usingIV. Advancing the State
of the Art of Power Grid
Consolidated Edis
Expedites R
Con Edison is deploying DA to operate resili
has expanded automated overhead switches
Sandy, Con Edison avoided more than 100 truc
Edison has also implemented SCADA system
Applied Communicati
Intrusio
ACS is partnering with Sacramento Municip
forming mesh networks beyond the wireless
customer data is protected in automated mete
mitigate supply chain cyber-threats, and mo
trolsystemsroadmap.net for more.
In 2009, as part of its ARRA grant proposal
deployed smart meter network. When the time
no commercial products available to provide th
went live in spring of 2013, and although this w
effort that have further strengthened existing
benefits from the system, such as enhance
(Controlsystemsroadmap.net, 2014).
ctober 2014, Vol. 27, Issue 8 1040-6190/Publautomated feeder switches to
isolate critical facilities and
minimize equipment damage.E. Energy storage provides
contingency reserves for grid
stabilityDistribution automation eases
the integration of DER, which
include distribution-level
equipment and systems that can
actively participate in power
system operations. Exampleson Company of New Yo
ecovery from Super Sto
ently against disruptions, reducing outages and h
by 35 percent, resulting in more than 17,000 avo
k rolls through automated operation of overhead
s with enhanced cybersecurity that reduce the r
on Sciences (ACS) Real-
n Detection for AMI an
al Utility District (SMUD) to address security, oper
gateways. For AMI, the project works to ensure
r reads. For DA, the project helps utilities continuou
nitor the field network health, performance, an
, SMUD stated a desire to deploy a wireless RF in
came to begin the wireless Intrusion Detection Sys
e desired functionality. So SMUD partnered with A
ork is not yet considered complete, SMUD has alre
cybersecurity protections and innovated new ca
d working relationships between information s
ished by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).,are load, plug-in electric
vehicles (PEV) with smart
chargers, and energy storage
that eases the integration of
intermittent renewable energy
resources, such as wind and
solar. NESCOR has developed a
report that describes the
cybersecurity requirements for
DER, reflecting DER functions in
the smart grid and taking into
account variations of DER
architectures
(Smartgrid.epri.com, 2003b).rk (Con Edison)
rm Sandy
astening outage restoration. The company
ided customer outages. During Hurricane
circuits to minimize customer impact. Con
isk of a cyber-attack.
Time Anomaly and
d DA
ations, and engineering needs in the self-
that customer privacy is preserved and
sly validate over-the-air security controls,
d security in real-time. Visit www.con-
trusion detection system for its yet-to-be-
tem (IDS) project in early 2012, there were
CS to jointly develop a solution. The project
ady realized a number of benefits from this
pabilities as well. They also report lateral
ecurity, the meter shop, and DA teamsCybersecurity
The following sections presentinsights of four SGIG recipients
that are advancing the state of
the art of power grid securityby designing cybersecurity into
the foundation of the smart
grid.A. Duke Energy ProgressDuke Energy Progress’s
EnergyWise initiatives leverageexisting program/project
management organizational
structures, standards, and
disciplines to manage for on-time,
on-budget delivery while
ensuring benefits realization. This
includes the following activities
and business drivers:under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2014.08.008
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Figure 3: Duke Energy Progress’s EnergyWise Initiatives
90 Deploy AMI that establishes
a scalable platform for cost-
effective advanced meter reading
(AMR)-AMI migration and
positions for dynamic rates;
 Deploy grid management
functionality that replaces
emergency voltage reduction
with utility-side demand
response capability for routine
operational use;
 Deploy monitoring
capability to critical transmission
infrastructure for asset and
demand management
functionality;
 Deploy feeder automation to
advance partial restoration
capabilities, and
 Build an advanced analytics
engine that forecasts, coordinates
and models a comprehensive
view of smart grid energy and
efficiency capabilities.The initiatives include a wide
range of smart grid technologies.
Figure 3 offers a list of the
initiatives that challenged the
normal approaches and work
practices of operations technology
(OT), information technology (IT),
and supply chain professionals.
D uke Energy Progress’sfundamental approach to
cybersecurity leverages a simple
defense-in-depth architecture
including the principles of ‘‘least
privilege’’ and default ‘‘deny
access’’ controls. Through ongoing
threat monitoring activities
(including some paid threat
monitoring and alerting services),
we know that cybersecurity threats
continue to increase in number,
complexity, and level of impact. At1040-6190/Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).the same time, business needs are
driving requirements for
increasing access and
interoperability across enterprise
applications, process computing
environments, enterprise
networks, and the Internet. These
requirements are rooted in the
need for sharing of data as a
business enabler and increased
leverage of automation and
intelligent technologies being
implemented. Many times these
business needs are in direct conflict
with security objectives, presenting
unique challenges and driving the
need to better leverage our existing
risk management methodology.
This business-risk balanced
approach required further
maturity of our risk management
lifecycle so that more risk
evaluation was performed during
product selection, implementation,
and post-deployment.
T he operational technologyand information technology
collaboration is largely education
and awareness of each other’s
perspective, so together the
resulting solution best meets the
business needs and provides
adequate security. This alignment
of skills drives thoroughopen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND licen
, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2014.08.008evaluation of the requirements,
product capabilities and
integration needed to provide the
right capability for the business
and security capabilities. To
ensure communication and
coordination, we developed a
new Enterprise Architecture
Review Process (EARP) and
created a committee made up of
OT and IT architects and
engineers to provide standards,
guidance, and governance to our
project teams. These formal
reviews (gates) require specific
artifacts demonstrating
adherence to standards and
documented follow-up of issues,
questions, and resolution of
outstanding items. The success of
this process has been so positive
that some project teams are even
soliciting additional EARP ‘‘pre-
gate’’ reviews aimed at achieving
understanding, guidance and
consensus of the architecture
review committee earlier than
required in the formal process.
Also, the new reference
architecture artifacts created
through the process have already
paid off in efficiency gains as
reuse opportunities have already
been realized.se (http:// The Electricity Journal
There are
many supply chain
vulnerabilities we
intend to mitigate
through these
enhanced processes
and increased
collaboration.
OT he OT, IT, and supply chaincollaboration ensures that
the right foundational capabilities
(e.g. network security,
authentication, monitoring,
configuration management, etc.)
are in the procured component or
solution. Our Supply Chain
Operating Framework includes
specific collaboration in the
following areas: purchasing,
contracting, category strategies
(roadmap and strategy sharing),
supplier management, and
performance monitoring. The
recently released Cybersecurity
Procurement Language for
Energy Delivery Systems has also
informed our efforts. (www.
controlsystemsroadmap.net,
2014) There are many supply
chain vulnerabilities we intend to
mitigate through these enhanced
processes and increased
collaboration will mitigate supply
chain vulnerabilities. Hardware
integrity during manufacturing
includes issues from chip
integrity to (digital) birth
certificates used in the initial
setup and provisioning of new
intelligent components as trusted
hosts. Poor practices and
inadequate planning of the
deployment phase could
introduce incomplete and/or
incorrect implementation
configurations, leaving
components at risk. There are
countless possibilities of
substitution of corrupted
components in transit,
warehouses, and with
distributors. Without adequate
security controls, testing andctober 2014, Vol. 27, Issue 8 1040-6190/Publverification, IT functions intended
to surveil, disrupt, deny, degrade,
compromise, or control the
performance of a product or
system could be introduced.
Accidental quality defects or
worse case, intentional corruption
of components and systems
intended to degrade,
compromise, or control the
system, create vulnerabilities
through embedded malware,
backdoors, Trojans, etc.Application vulnerabilities that
could be avoided can result from
poor coding practices and
inadequate testing (e.g., Open
Web Application Security Project
Top 10 (Owasp.org, 2014), 2011
CWE/SANS Top 25 Most
Dangerous Software Errors
(Sans.org, 2014), etc.).
Through our engagement with
DOE, NIST, and industry peers
we further matured our
architecture and design
approaches to architect
cybersecurity into the solution
beginning at the concept stage.
This ensures that major
architectural decisions areished by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).,influenced by the requirement to
be secure and resilient. Even
though we were already using
numerous guidance documents
and interoperability standards for
all initiatives (e.g. DHS Cyber
Security Procurement Language
for Control Systems (USDHS,
2009), ISO/IEC 27000 series (Org,
2014), NIST 800 series (Csrc,
2014), IEEE (Standards.ieee.org,
2014), AMI-SEC
(Osgug.ucaiug.org, 2014), etc.) we
directly embedded key steps from
the NISTIR 7628 (NIST, 2010) into
our architecture and design
processes. As part of the plan,
ongoing cybersecurity
evaluations are to be performed
during the design and
procurement, installation,
commissioning, and the ongoing
maintenance and support phases
of the project. The strategies used
at each project phase include
these security-related activities:
 Design Phase: Security
driven architecture and risk-
balanced methodology based on
current cybersecurity standards
(ISO/NIST). Business impact
analysis for disaster recovery. A
lightweight, concise privacy
impact analysis aimed at
identifying sensitive information
in the solution.
 Procurement Phase:
Technical governance reviews,
technology specific risk and
vulnerability assessment, code
review, and third-party
evaluation or testing as required.
 Installation Phase: Change
control, security testing and
internal controls implementation.under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2014.08.008
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92 Commissioning Phase:
Training, procedure
development, new procedure
implementation, and acceptance
checklist sign-off.
 Ongoing maintenance and
support Phase: Monitoring,
logging, alarming, incident and
response management, lifecycle
management, and system back-
up.D uke Energy Progress’sGRID WAN is an example
of how these processes manifest
themselves in practice. GRID
WAN is a dedicated wide area
network employing secure
gateways, encrypted VPNs,
switches, routers, firewalls, and
secure remote access to segregate
and protect networks. This
comprehensive solution supports
all smart grid applications.B. FirstEnergyFirstEnergy’s cybersecurity
plan describes the responsibilities
for implementing the FirstEnergy
Smart Grid Modernization
Initiative Cyber Security
Program. The plan describes how
FirstEnergy uses NIST 800-53
(NIST, 2009), FirstEnergy Cyber
Security Programs (based on ISO
standards and best practices), and
FirstEnergy CIP Cyber Security
Programs. The plan contains a
description of FirstEnergy’s
defense-in-depth posture,
business practices, cybersecurity
programs and project lifecycle
management to illustrate
FirstEnergy’s commitment to
cybersecurity.1040-6190/Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).A number of risks were
identified as a part of developing
the plan. These risks include:
physical access to smart meters
and other devices exposed to the
public, privacy concerns, and
wireless transmission of data. In
some cases, these risks required a
new thought process and
additional controls to be
implemented for mitigation.Many of the controls to mitigate
identified vulnerabilities and
risks were already in place at
FirstEnergy. It is the goal of the
plan to ensure that these controls
are applied to the new technology
deployed as part of the SGIG
project. Processes such as project
review, patching, and
assessments are described as part
of the ongoing project lifecycle.
The cybersecurity challenges
FirstEnergy has experienced with
the SGIG project are those
experienced by most
cybersecurity organizations. For
instance, working with vendors to
clarify the need to maintain a
balance between proprietary
communications andopen access article under the CC BY-NC-ND licen
, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2014.08.008inspectability. For instance,
vendors need to understand what
is or isn’t normal for smart meter
communications, especially with
regard to implementing the
Amilyzer (see below). An
additional challenge is the classic
conflicting goals of functionality
vs. security, i.e. how to make it
work while ensuring it is secure.
In most cases, this requires new
best practices or innovations due
to a bolting-on of security by
vendors who have always
considered physical security
aspects, and must now also
consider the cybersecurity
aspects. Finally, metrics are a
challenge. How do you quantify
security testing success?
Assessments work well to a
degree, but is the answer that a
device hasn’t been exploited a real
measure? Or has the vulnerability
not been made known or
discovered at the time.
W orking through thecybersecurity aspects of
the SGIG project, we have learned
that we need to have an assurance
of our engineers’ and project
managers’ awareness of
cybersecurity. They must be able
to ask themselves, ‘‘Is this a
cybersecurity concern?’’
Additionally, it is important to be
involved in project meetings, to
understand what is happening
and when, in order to provide the
necessary consulting to ensure
cybersecurity concerns are
addressed and controls are
implemented. Vendors need to
increasingly consider appropriate
cybersecurity controls now.se (http:// The Electricity Journal
OUtilities have been addressing
these for some time, and it is
encouraging that vendors have
taken the initiative to develop
more cybersecurity controls in
their devices and update issues
found in their software/
firmware. These lessons learned
offer several examples of how this
project has contributed to
advancing the state of the art for
energy sector cybersecurity.1. Amilyzer
In early 2012, FirstEnergy and
researchers at TCIPG started
collaborating on a new
specification-based IDS system
for smart meters called Amilyzer
(Tcipg.org, 2014b). The software
system passively monitors AMI
traffic at the network, transport,
and application layers to ensure
that smart meters are running in a
secure state and that their
operations respect a specified
security policy. This policy is
derived from the electric sector
failure scenarios defined by
NESCOR (Smartgrid.epri.com,
2014). Amilyzer has been
successfully deployed by
FirstEnergy in a testing state to
monitor a 12,000-meter AMI over
the past year.
Amilyzer provides in-depth
visibility over the traffic captured
between the collection engines
and meters. An important
challenge has been to translate the
large volume of low-level packets
captured into high-level
actionable information that
security engineers can leverage to
ensure the resiliency of thectober 2014, Vol. 27, Issue 8 1040-6190/Publinfrastructure. Being able to test
Amilyzer on a live AMI has
enabled the team to greatly
improve the C12.22 packet
dissection library and to develop
a more robust system. The team is
now working on finalizing a Web
user interface to allow the security
team to visualize periodic reports
and to write custom IDS
signatures. From a researchperspective, traffic analysis
algorithms are now being
developed to be able to gain better
visibility over encrypted traffic
without having to share
decryption keys with the IDS
sensors.C. Northern Virginia Electric
CooperativeNOVEC recognized the value
and the need for a formal,
structured, approach to
cybersecurity following the initial
2007 deployment of digital
substation equipment, generally
described with the common term
of ‘‘intelligent electronic devices
(IEDs).’’ While the operationalished by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).,benefits of the technology were
realized early on, the potential
vulnerability of digital
equipment, via the SCADA and
substation networks, to
unauthorized access and control
became a recognized concern.
T he SGIG program providedan impetus to elevate
cybersecurity to a higher level of
active functional management.
This initiative takes place within
an integrated approach to protect
the electric distribution system as
well as the key interfacing
business systems. The SGIG
process recognized the various
emerging standards and cyber
principles which have provided
guidance to develop an effective
framework and implementation
plan. Some of these guidance
documents and standards
referenced in the development of
NOVEC’s plan included 21 Steps
to Improve Cyber Security of
SCADA Networks (Energy.gov,
2014b), NIST cybersecurity and
interoperability standards, NERC
CIP standards, and others.
A guiding principle has been to
ensure physical separation of the
substation and SCADA networks
from the corporate enterprise
network and, indirectly, the
Internet. NOVEC adheres to the
‘‘Do no harm’’ principle by
carefully selecting security
hardware and software tools,
systems, and protocols that will
not compromise the ultimate
purpose of the IED’s and
automation system, which is to
sustain NOVEC’s very high level
of system reliability.under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2014.08.008
93
94Implementation efforts to date
have strengthened the security
perimeter of the SCADA network,
created stronger authorized
access controls, stronger remote
access controls, and stronger
physical security.
E arly in NOVEC’s automationprogram we recognized the
vital role that a secure
communications system plays.
NOVEC relies on its private fiber
optics-based communications
network both for operational
reliability as well as security and it
has continued to expand the fiber
network which currently connects
85 percent of its substations,
supplemented with licensed
microwave for the remainder.
Communications with distribution
automation components rely on a
combination of fiber and third-
party commercial services to
which layered security measures
are applied prior to receiving
transmitted data into the SCADA
network.
N OVEC’s commitment tocybersecurity includes a
vigilant effort to protect the
distribution system and power
plants under our purview.
Periodic security assessments
including penetration testing are
one component of the active
cybersecurity program.
Programmatic methods of
monitoring, recognizing and
assessing vulnerabilities, a
disciplined adherence to
procedures, followed by
appropriate responses, will help
to effectively mitigate the impact
of potential threats.1040-6190/Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).V. Evolving the Reliable
Grid of the Past into the
Reliable Grid of the
FutureDOE and the energy sector are
partnering to manage cyber-risk,
keeping energy delivery reliable
as smart grid technologies
modernize the power grid. Each
day, the sector is coming closer to
the Roadmap vision that by 2020
resilient energy delivery systems
are designed, installed, operated,
and maintained to survive a
cyber-incident while sustaining
critical functions
(Controlsystemsroadmap.net,
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